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Abstract 
In this paper we use two very large panel datasets from Poland, 1988-90 and 
Czechoslovakia, 1990-1992 to explore the dynamics of employment and wage 
determination at the enterprise level in the early years of transition. The study is intended 
to assist in building a coherent picture of microeconomic adjustment in transition, a field 
which was not sufficiently explored in the early years of reform. We find that Polish 
firms were already to some extent responsive to market conditions pre-reform, notably to 
demand in determining employment. Czechoslovak firms, however, were largely 
unresponsive to such pressures in 1989-90. The elasticities rose significantly in both 
countries in the early years of reform, especially in Czechoslovakia which quickly 
attained initial Polish patterns of adjustment. Firms became much more responsive to 
sales and cost pressures in adjusting employment and to their own productivity in setting 
pay. Ownership effects in these early years were, however, much more modest, with 
state-owned firms adjusting employment more than their private counterparts, perhaps 
because over-manning was more serious in that sector. 
JEL classification: 523, J30, P1 1 . 
Keywords: employment, wages, transition, 
1. Introduction 
The economies of Central and Eastern Europe are well advanced in their dramatic 
transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented system. Cross-country 
comparisons indicate that in terms of many variables, the transition experience has been 
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diverse. Some countries, such as the Czech Republic (see Svejnar, 1993, Russia (see 
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995) and former East Germany (see Carlin, 1994) have, 
for instance, succeeded in carrying out a massive privatization of state property. Others, 
such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania have been much slower in privatizing 
their state sectors (see, e.g., Estrin, 1994). Some, such as the Czech Republic, have 
followed the orthodox model of first stabilizing at the macro level and then restructuring 
at the level of sectors, industries and firms. Others have also shown that it is possible to 
reorient exports, create new firms, and commercialize existing firms amidst 
macroeconomic instability (see, e.g., Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1995). 
There are some patterns, however, which have clearly emerged from the official 
statistics for the first two or three years of transition and which deserve systematic 
analysis. First, aggregate output fell dramatically in all the economies in the first phase of 
transition, with the fall exceeding 20 per cent in most countries’ (see, e.g., World Bank 
Development Report, 1996). Second, employment also fell in those early years, although 
its decline was less pronounced and somewhat lagging behind the decrease in output. 
Third, real wages fell dramatically in the first two years of transition as the countries 
devalued their currencies, freed most prices and imposed wage (bill) controls. With the 
exception of the Czech and Slovak Republics, where producer and consumer price 
indices moved more or less in tandem (see Dyba and Svejnar, 1995), the decline in real 
producer wages was much less pronounced than the decline in real consumer wages4 The 
fourth important feature, for which the experience of all the countries except for the 
Czech Republic and former Soviet Union is identical, is the rapidly rising and 
persistently high unemployment rate.’ Much less, however, is known about how firms 
have adjusted to the enormous changes in their structures, macroenvironment and 
operating conditions and the factors influencing their responsiveness to changes in policy 
parameters. 
This has made analysts and policy-makers switch from an almost exclusive focus on 
macro-stabilization issues in the early phase of transition to a more balanced view of the 
relative importance of macro and micro developments. For example, evaluations such as 
those of the EBRD Transition Report and the World Bank Development Report have 
begun to place increasing emphasis on institutional legal and microeconomic change. 
Indeed, there is growing consensus that understanding the behaviour of enterprises and 
their responses to policy measures may be crucial for a successful transition. In this 
paper, we seek to contribute to this movement by using large, enterprise-level panel 
datasets from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland to provide a systematic analysis 
of the employment and wage-setting behaviour at the enterprise level for various types of 
firms during the different stages of early transition. Our empirical framework is outlined 
in the following section, and the empirical work is reported in the third. Conclusions are 
drawn in the final section. 
2. The analytical framework 
The paper seeks to provide micro-econometric evidence on the adjustment of enterprise 
wages and employment at different stages of transition in Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovalua. We use annual enterprise-level data from 1988 to 1992 to estimate 
augmented employment and wage equations, from which we calculate estimates of labour 
demand and wage elasticities to be contrasted across countries and years. 
In estimating the employment equation, we use the following general specification: 
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where L = number of employees, W = the real producer wage (nominal wage deflated by 
the producer price index), Q = the real sales of the firm (nominal sales deflated by the 
producer price index), and X = a vector of structural and policy variables that may affect 
the firm's demand for labour. The specification in Equation (1) corresponds to a labour 
demand function of an enterprise characterized by cost minimization subject to an 
exogenously given level of output (see, e.g., Hamermesh, 1986). This approach has been 
used fruitfully in the West (Hamermesh, 1986) and it appears appropriate in the present 
context in that the negative sales shock brought about by the dissolution of the CMEA, 
the collapse of the Soviet market, and the restrictive macroeconomic policies probably 
imposed an exogenous sales constraint on firms in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, the sampled firms may not have been entirely sales constrained and despite 
wage (bill) controls in the countries in question, wages may not have been set 
exogenously outside the firm. As a result, in addition to using ordinary least squares 
(OLS), we also estimate Equation (1) with W and Q instrumented by exogenous and 
predetermined variables. 
The hypothesis that, in addition to exogenous factors, wages may depend on 
enterprise characteristics leads us to estimate a wage regression of the form: 
W = W(Q/L, Z), 
where Q/L = sales p e r  employee and Z = a vector of relevant structural and policy 
variables that may affect wages in a given firm. Sales per  employee is included as an 
indicator of rents potentially available for distribution within the firm, and therefore as a 
firm-specific proxy for ability to pay. Sales per employee may however be endogenous 
and we instrument QL in our estimates of Equation (2) by exogenous and pre- 
determined variables. 
The period of analysis covers several years but our interest is in behavioural change 
which is best viewed via year-to-year variation. However, adjustment by firms is not 
likely to be instantaneous so we allow for dynamics in estimating both Equations (1) and 
(2) (see, e.g. ,  Nickell, 1986). We specify the two equations in loglinear form and 
introduce a partial adjustment framework by including the lagged dependent variable on 
the right-hand side, as well as a more general dynamic framework by allowing all the 
principal right-hand side variables to enter in both current and lagged form (see, e.g. ,  
Hendry and Mizon, 1978 and Estrin and Svejnar, 1993). Formally, Equation (1) is then: 
In Ll = a. + al In(W), + az Ln(W),.1 + a3 In Ql + ad In Q,., a5LnXI 
+ c ~ i r  In X,.l + a7 In Ll.I (1') 
Note that, within Equation (l'),  one can conveniently test if (a) a partial adjustment 
model is the appropriate specification a2=c14=ag=0, (b) a completely static model is 
supported by the data and a2=a4=a6=a7=0, (c) a fixed effects model is the preferred 
specification a2=a1, a4=a3. ag=c15, and a7=1. The model in Equation (1') therefore nests a 
variety of plausible specifications. The dynamic wage equation is specified analogously 
to the employment Equation (l'),  and parallel tests can be applied. 
3. Data and empirical findings 
Summary statistics on firm-level and more aggregate variables used in the analysis are 
given in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of annual 
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Czechoslovak data for 1990-92. Table 2 contains data for Polish firms during the 1988- 
90 period. These data cover the majority of Czechoslovak and Polish industrial firms. 
They provide production, employment and wage statistics, as well as information on 
some other variables. However, they are relatively uninformative about many aspects of 
enterprise performance. As a result, we have also analysed data from a special survey of 
200 Polish industrial enterprises undertaken in 1993-94 as part of the World Bank 
project on Enterprise Performance in Transition. The 200 firm sample is a structured 
random sample, selected to contain 60 per cent state-owned firms, 20 per cent privatized 
firms, and 20 per cent de novo formed private companies (see Belka et. al.,  (1994) for a 
detailed discussion of the sample).6 
Table 1. Means (standard deviations) of principal variables for Czechoslovakia, 
1990-92 
1990 1991 1992 
Average monthly wage (Kcs) 3,249 3,757 4,357 
(394) (608) (97 1) 
Consumer price index (%) 10.4 61.2 10.1 
Producer price index (%) 4.8 68.9 5.3 
Sales (million Kcs) 208.59 213.95 445.94 
(5 8 8.9) (936.89) (2,l 18.70) 
1,832 1,257 700 
(3,939) (2,93 1) (1,911) 
No. of employees 
Table 2. Means (standard deviations) of principal variables for Poland, 1988-90 
1988 1989 1990 
Average annual wage (1,000 ZI) 608.93 2,291.09 10,460.34 
(164.33) (604.17) (3.357.45) 
Consumer price index 
(1988 = 100) 
Producer price index 
(1988 = 100) 
100.00 35 1.08 2,407.58 
(0) (0) (0) 
100.00 321.60 2,054.14 
(5.01) (38.63) (419.0) 
No. of employees 126.45 694.30 701.65 
(1,315.31) (1,271.05) (1,293.23) 
Sales (million Zl) 5,838.56 18,509.41 100,458.78 
(19,7 19.14) (57,003.68) (39,866.04) 
In examining the nominal monthly wages and price indices in Table 1, one observes 
the well documented phenomenon of real wages falling dramatically in Czechoslovakia 
in 1991 and gaining some ground in 1992. One can also see clearly the less well 
documented rising dispersion in inter-enterprise earnings during the transition, with the 
standard deviation starting at 394 Kcs in 1990 and reaching 971 Kcs in 1992. With the 
average wage rising from 3,249 crowns in 1990 to 4,357 Kcs in 1992, the coefficient of 
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variation increased from 12 per cent to 22 per cent in this period.' 
The average number of employees per  firm decreased steadily from 1,832 to 700 
during the 1990-92 period, reflecting significant reductions of the labour force in 
many firms, the major wave of breakups and spin-offs of firms,' and the entry of 
many smaller firms. One also observes a major real decrease in sales between 1990 
and 1991 as transition started and firms became temporarily demand constrained. 
There was a significant increase in average sales between 1991 and 1992 as firms 
unloaded accumulated inventories. 
The Polish data in Table 2 tell a different story, with average employment per 
firm hovering around 700 throughout the 1988-90 period. The difference between 
the Czechoslovak and Polish data is in part accounted for by the fact that Poland did 
not create the same giant enterprises as did Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the 
1980s, as well as by the fact that the Polish dataset does not include small private 
firms.' 
3.1, Employment 
Estimated coefficients of the employment equation are presented in Tables 3-5. 
Table 3 contains estimates for the recorded population of Czechoslovak industrial 
firms during the 1989-92 period. Estimates in Table 4 relate to the recorded 
population of Polish industrial firms between 1988 and 1990. Table 5 presents 
results based on data from 161-163 Polish firms that were sampled as part of the 
200 firm survey in 1992-93. The datasets hence enable us to provide a relatively 
uninterrupted chronicle of the employment behaviour of Czechoslovak firms before 
and during the transition, as well as a somewhat more synthetic chronology of the 
developments in Polish industry. 
Since transition is a dynamic process, which strives to change fundamentally the 
functioning of an economy, our approach is to estimate the dynamic model given by 
Equation (1') on short (two-year), consecutive panels of data. This approach enables 
us to take advantage of the panel nature of the data, leads to a minimal loss of data 
brought about by enterprise breakups, and permits us to identify structural 
(coefficient) changes over the different phases of transition. For the Czechoslovak 
data we hence present in  Table 3 estimates for the pre-transition period of 1989-90, 
the early transition period of 1990-91, and the somewhat more mature .( 1991-92) 
phase of transition. For Poland, we present in Table 4 results for the pre-transition 
period of 1988-89 and the early transition period of 1989-90. Estimates for the 
more mature phase of Polish transition are reported for the smaller sample of firms 
in Table 5 .  The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 are instrumental variable (IV) estimates, 
and those in Table 5 use OLS." The instrumental variables used in the larger 
datasets to obtain predicted values of sales and wages are ownership, industry and 
district (regional) dummy variables. In all regressions the fully fledged dynamic 
model with lagged endogenous variables proved to dominate statistically the more 
restricted (nested) versions. Nevertheless, we also present some of the more 
restricted estimates for the sake of comparison and for a better understanding of the 
transition process. 
3.1 .la The Czechoslovak estimates 
The 1989-92 Czechoslovak estimates in Table 3 indicate that firms' employment- 
setting behaviour at the start of the transition was characterized by significant 
inertia, as the 1989-90 estimated coefficient on lagged employment (0.975) was 
close to unity. The persistence decreased somewhat as transition unfolded in 1991- 
92, although the coefficient remained above 0.9. 
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Table 3. IV estimates of employment equation for Czechoslovak firms, 1989-92 
(Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, In L,; values in 
parentheses are standard errors) 
In L,., 
In 0 ,  
In Q ,., 
In W , 
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-0.7 8 8 * * 
(0.128) (0.352) (0.099) (0*452) 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Signigicant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%. 
Note: The Constant term (base) refers to ‘other’ ownership and legal form. 
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N 1,290 1,290 1,751 1,751 2,933 2,944 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Signigicant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%. 
Note: The Constant term (base) refers to ‘other’ ownership and legal form. 
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As may be seen from the 1989-90 Column (1) in Table 3, the short-term elasticity of 
labour demand with respect to sales, given by the coefficient on In Q, was statistically 
significant, but small, at 0.1 in the pre-transition period. In the turbulent 1990-9 1 period, 
this short-term elasticity remained low at 0.07 but, as transition unfolded, it rose to 0.35, 
suggesting that firms started reacting to output changes by adjusting employment. It is 
worth noting that the corresponding static estimates of output elasticity, in Columns (2) 
of Table 3, are high and decreasing over time. These estimates are, of course,, essentially 
cross-sectional ones, reflecting to a significant extent the fact that employment varies 
positively with output across firms. 
The short-term employment elasticity with respect to the wage, given by the 
coefficient on In W,, was -0.28 before the transition and turned to positive 0.25 in 1990- 
91 as both real wages and employment fell during the ‘big bang’ of 1991. In 1991-92 the 
elasticity became again negative at -0.19. As in the case of sales, the statistically 
dominated static specifications in Columns (2) of Table 3 point to a high and, since 
1990-91, decreasing elasticity of labour demand with respect to the wage. 
While the mainstream view is that private firms hoard less labour than state-owned 
ones, the effect of ownership on employment in the Czechoslovak data is not uniform and 
clear-cut. In Table 3 we also present estimates of the effect of ownership and legal form. 
In particular, during the transition, Czechoslovak firms with given ownership could 
register under various (and changing) legal forms. We have, therefore, included types of 
ownership as well as the various legal forms as dummy variables in the regressions. In 
the dynamic specifications reported in Columns ( I )  of Table 3, the estimated coefficients 
on the ownership variables indicate that in 1990-91 and 1991-92 the state-owned 
enterprises reduced employment more significantly than private and foreign-owned 
firms. These findings may, of course, be consistent with the hypothesis that state-owned 
enterprises have been quite dynamic but had, and perhaps continue to have, more labour 
than the private and foreign-owned firms. The coefficients from the static specifications 
in Columns (2), reflecting to a large extent cross-sectional differences among firms, are 
consistent with this story. While the dummy variable on state ownership is negative and 
significant at -0.55 in the turbulent period of 1990-91, when one takes into account the 
effect of legal form, the differential between state and non-state firms basically 
disappears. In 1991-92, state-owned enterprises are, in fact, found to have a higher level 
of employment, ceteris paribus, than either private or foreign-owned firms. This suggests 
that as late as 1991-92 state-owned firms still had a larger stock of labour, ceteris 
paribus, than the other types of firm. The domestic-foreign joint ventures are an 
interesting case, showing a significant reduction in employment in  1990-91, and 
resembling the employment behaviour of private firms thereafter. 
3.1.2.  The Polish estimates 
The Polish estimates in Table 4 are based on the large industrial dataset containing 
almost 5,000 firms. They show coefficient estimates on lagged employment of 1 .OO in the 
1988-89 period. Taken together with the other coefficients, this result indicates that the 
first difference specification characterizes well the pre-reform period. By 1989-90, as the 
‘big bang’ started, the dynamic model dominates and the coefficient on lagged 
employment dips significantly below unity. Clearly more research in this area will be 
needed as data for additional years come on-stream. 
The short-run sales elasticity of employment is estimated at 0.34 in 1988-89 and 0.25 
in 1989-90. The two elasticities are not significantly different from one another and are 
similar to the corresponding elasticity of 0.35 found in Czechoslovakia during the 
transition (199 1-92). Poland hence entered the transition with employment reacting to 
output changes more readily than it did in Czechoslovakia before and at the start of the 
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transition, and it was only by 1991-92 that the Czech elasticity paralleled that of Poland 
in 1989-90. The corresponding static (cross-sectional) employment elasticity with 
respect to output stayed about constant at 0.81-0.83 in the 1988-90 period, displaying 
little of the decline observed in Czechoslovakia. 
Table 4. IV estimates of employment equation for Polish firms, 1988-90 
(Dependent variable is In L,; values in parentheses are standard errors) 
In Q, 













-0.215*** -0.703* -0.413* 






(0.01 I )  
-0.999* 
(0.206) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
E2 
N 
0.98 0.83 0.98 0.85 
4.922 4.922 4.858 4.858 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%. 
As in the Czechoslovak data, the short-run wage elasticity of labour demand is negative, 
but it displays no switching of the sign and, in fact, rises significantly from -0.22 in 1988- 
89 to -0.4 1 in 1989-90. The Polish data thus indicate that the negative relationship was not 
reversed during the ‘big bang’ and, in fact, became stronger. The static model also produces 
negative and rising elasticities, with the values being higher than in the dynamic 
specifications. 
The estimates of the employment equation for 161-163 Polish firms in 1992-93 are 
presented in Table 5. The dynamic specification in Column (1) generates a similar point 
estimate for lagged employment as did the 1989-90 data in Table 4. The estimates of short- 
run output effect (0.23) and wage effect (-0.29) also are very similar to those found in the 
large sample for 1989-90. These estimates, together with those on lagged output and wages, 
thus suggest that dynamic adjustment in the labour market remained similar between 1990 
and 1993. 
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Table 5. OLS estimates of employment equation (1') for Polish firms, 1992-93 
(Dependent variable is  in L ,  ; values in parentheses are standard errors) 
In L I.l 
In Q,  
In Q (., 
In W 
In w I., 
(Liq. assewcurrent liab.), 
(Liq. assewcurrent 
% Equipment > 15 yrs old 
% Q based on foreign design 
% Capacity utilization 
Perceived market share 
% of labour unionized 


































































N 161 163 
* Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. 
Note: The Constant term refers to traditional state-owned enterprises. 
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Table 6. IV estimates of wage equation for Czechoslovak firms, 1989-92 















0.912* 0.85 1 * 0.778* 
(0.029) (0.042) (0.044) 
0.067* 0.093* 0.102* 0.147* 0.150* 0.1 15* 
(0.012) (0.01 1) (0.009) (0.010) (0.027) (0.01 1) 
-0.03 1 ** -0.03 2* * -0.1 oo* 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.028) 
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1.290 1.290 1.75 1 1.75 1 2.933 2.933 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%. 
Note: The Constant term (base) refers to ‘other’ ownership and legal form. 
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Table 7. IV estimates of wage equation for Polish firms, 1988-90 





0.128 0.200* 0.297* 0.191* 





Type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.45 0.327 0.627 0.49 
N 4,922 4,922 4,858 4,858 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%. 
The 1992-93 survey also permits us to explore the employment effect of a number of 
structural features of these firms. The quick ratio (liquid assetskurrent liabilities), 
proxying the lack of financial distress of the firm, has a positive short-term effect on 
employment. The vintage of capital, proxied by the percentage of equipment that is 
reported to be more than 15 years old, does not appear to affect employment. Firms with 
a greater share of output based on foreign design tend to employ more workers, while 
capacity utilization and perceived market share are unrelated to employment. 
Unionization does not affect employment in the dynamic framework, although in the 
static (cross-sectional) model one finds that more unionized firms tend to have more 
employees, cereris paribus. Similarly, emerging private and privatized firms have 
significantly fewer employees than traditional state-owned firms in the static estimates. 
However, when the previous year’s employment level is taken into account through the 
dynamic specification, the effect persists only in the case of privatized firms. 
Commercialization does not have a strong negative effect on employment in any 
specification. 
3.2. Wages 
Estimates of the wage equations based on the three datasets are reported in Tables 6-8, 
respectively. Our empirical strategy is analogous to that used in estimating the 
employment equationsdynamic and static models are estimated on short (two-year) 
panels. 
The estimates based on the 1989-92 Czechoslovak data indicate that the effect of the 
previous year’s wage on current wage was diminishing steadily from 0.91 in 1989-90 to 
0.78 in 1991-92. The initial inertia in wage-setting was thus diminishing over time. 
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Table 8. OLS estimates of wage equation for Polish firms, 1992-93 
(Dependent variable is In W ,  : values in parentheses are standard errors) 
(1) (2) 
In W 0.687* 
(0.097) 
ln (QK), 0.326* 0.237* 
(0.058) (0.040) 
In (QK) I., -0.269* 
(0.069) 
In (liq. assets/ current liab.), 0.003 0.012 
(0.026) (0.030) 
In (liq. assets/ current liab.) 0.035 0.058** 
(0.024) (0.028) 
% Sales exported to CMEA, 0.005** 0.004** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
% Sales exported to non-CMEA, 0.0003 0.000 
(0.0008) (0.001) 
% Sales to government 0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Perceived market share 0.0007 0.0006 
(0.0005) (0.0006) 
% Labour unionized 0.0012 0.001 
(0.oow (0.001) 
% Debt to firms overdue > 1 year -0.0016 -0.001 
(0.001 1) (0.001) 
% Debt to banks overdue > 1 year -0.0002 0.0004 
(0.001 1) (0.0013) 
% Debt to government overdue > 1 year -0.0002 -0.001 
(0.0009) (0.00 1) 
% of receivables overdue > 1 year 





0.02 1 -0.037 
(0.082) (0.096) 











N 157 159 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%. 
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The short-term wage effect of sales per employee, proxying the firm’s ability to pay, 
is found to be positive and increasing over time from 0.07 in 1989-90 to 0.15 in 1991- 
92. The wage-setting process thus increasingly reflected firm-specific ability to pay 
rather than general labour market conditions. 
While raw data show that, on average, private firms pay less and foreign firms pay 
more than others, the multiple regression framework indicates that this pattern does not 
hold very clearly, once we control for other variables such as sales per employee. Indeed, 
private firms and domestic-foreign joint ventures appear to have increased wages relative 
to others in 1990-91, while state-owned firms reduced wages in 1991-92. The static 
1991-92 estimates indicate that co-operatives pay significantly less and joint ventures 
more than all other firms. 
The 1988-90 Polish estimates reported in Table 7 imply a relatively low and 
declining level of inertia in the wage-setting process, with the coefficient on lagged wage 
in the dynamic model dropping from 0.83 in 1988-89 to 0.58 in 1989-90. The estimated 
short-run elasticity of output per  employee on wages is found to be positive and rising 
from a statistically insignificant 0.13 in 1988-89 to significant 0.30 in 1989-90. The 
effect of a firm’s ability to pay on wages was thus increasing over time and became more 
important in Poland than in Czechoslovakia during the transition. The Polish effect is 
found to be significantly positive and stable at 0.19-0.20 in the static framework. 
Estimates based on the 1992-93 Polish survey data, reported in Table 8, also generate 
a relatively low coefficient (0.69) on lagged wage. Moreover, the 0.32 short-run elasticity 
of sales per  employee (firm’s ability to pay) on wages is very similar to the 0.30 point 
estimate found in the large sample in 1989-90 in Table 7.  The static elasticity estimate of 
0.24 is also quite similar to the 0.19 estimate found in the large sample. Like the 
employment equation estimates, the wage equation estimates thus suggest that the 
dynamics remained relatively unchanged between 1989-90 and 1992-93. 
Wages are also found to be unrelated to financial distress of the firm, but they are 
positively related to the percentage of sales exported to the former CMEA countries. The 
latter finding suggests that the former CMEA market is less competitive, allowing firms 
to generate greater surplus and hence pay higher wages. Perceived market share, degree 
of unionization of the firm’s labour force, long-term indebtedness or receivables are all 
found to be unrelated to wages. Similarly, ownership and commercialization are found to 
have no effect on wages, once productivity, industry and region have been controlled for. 
4. Concluding observations 
This paper seeks to illustrate restructuring behaviour in firms in the early years of 
transition by using panel data methods to explore wage and employment adjustment 
between pairs of years at the enterprise level. The datasets being studied represent 
virtually all industrial firms in Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively in the relevant 
periods. 
The estimated equations highlight some important aspects of enterprise behaviour at 
the start of the transformation process. Firstly, we confirm that Polish firms were already 
more responsive to external and market pressures than their Czechoslovak counterparts 
in 1990, in the sense that inertia in employment and wage-setting was typically lower, 
and market or firm specific factors were already significant and displaying higher 
elasticities in the Polish sample. However, it is striking that almost immediately after the 
Czechoslovak ‘big bang’ in 1991, the relevant elasticities there started to increase and 
often reached the levels attained by Poland a few years previously. The Polish elasticities 
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continued to rise in the same period, though at a less dramatic rate. 
This suggests there may be a common pattern to these elasticities through the 
transition process, as firms find themselves for the first time facing hard budget 
constraints and changing external market conditions. In the period of central planning, 
decisions on employment and wages were explained primarily by the previous year’s 
experience but, as market pressures begin to bite, employment adjustments become more 
closely associated with sales, while wages tend to be increased more in line with the 
firm’s ability to pay. Poland had already embarked on this path before the reforms of 
1990, while the remnants of central planning were only finally abolished in 
Czechoslovakia at the start of 1991, which explains the different pattern of the estimated 
parameters. It is particularly interesting to note that by 1992 wage cost factors were 
beginning to play a significant role in employment decisions in Czechoslovak firms, with 
a negative significant coefficient on wages in the labour demand equation. Wage costs 
played a persistently more significant role in the more decentralized Polish economy, 
even at the start of transition. 
The estimates also shed some light on the vexed question of ownership effects on 
employment and wages (see also Commander and Coricelli, 1994). The key finding is 
that, while there may be some impact from private or foreign owners on employment, 
one can find no comparable evidence in the wage equations once we control for 
differences in productivity. In Czechoslovakia, the equations show that state-owned firms 
reduce employment more than private or foreign-owned ones. We interpret this to imply 
that there was considerably more restructuring in state-owned firms, perhaps as a 
consequence of hard budget constraints (see Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1995). However, 
state-owned firms are also found to have more over-manning than private companies, and 
many therefore have more of an employment restructuring problem to solve. These 
findings are consistent with the results from the small Polish sample as well. However, 
while the raw data suggest that, on average, foreign firms in Czechoslovakia paid more 
and private firms less, no clear pattern holds in the multiple regression framework. We 
find no significant ownership effects in the Polish wage equations. 
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University of Michigan, William Davidson Institute, 9* Floor, 701 Tappan Street, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, USA. 
Growth is now once again well established in most countries of Central Europe 
though not for the most part in the economies of the former Soviet Union (see 
EBRD Transition Report, 1995, 1996). 
Real producer wages are defined as nominal wages deflated by the producer price 
index, while real consumer wages refer to nominal wages deflated by the 
consumer price index. Real wages have since risen. 
In the case of the former Soviet Union, one observes low unemployment rates 
which are attributable primarily to the continuation of soft budget policies. These 
policies have presumably allowed firms to continue hoarding labour and thus 
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Commander, 1994). Unemployment has now begun to fall in much of Central 
Europe in parallel with the strong growth performance, but it remains 
uncomfortably high. 
The 200 firm sample is therefore not representative and one must be careful in 
using it to make inferences about the performance of Polish industrial firms in 
general. As Prasnikar, Svejnar, Mihaljek and Prasnikar (1994) have shown on 
Yugoslav data, non-random samples can produce misleading results in this area. 
Using Czech and Slovak household expenditure data, Garner, Lubyova and 
Terrell (1995) also find an increase in the coefficient of variation for blue and 
white collar workers’ incomes between 1989 and 1992. 
See Lizal, Singer and Svejnar (1995) for an analysis of the spin-offs. 
The summary statistics for the 1992-93 Polish survey of 200 firms are reported in 
Belka et. al. (1994). 
The survey unfortunately does not contain exogenous series that could be 
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